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Abstract
For Autonomous AI systems to be accepted and trusted, the users should be able to
understand the reasoning process of the system (i.e., the system should be transpar-
ent). Robotics presents unique programming difficulties in that systems need to map
from complicated sensor inputs such as camera feeds and laser scans to outputs such
as joint angles and velocities. Advances in Deep Neural Networks are now making it
possible to replace laborious handcrafted features and control code by learning control
policies directly from high dimensional sensor inputs. Because Atari games, where
these capabilities were first demonstrated, replicate the robotics problem they are ideal
for investigating how humans might come to understand and interact with agents who
have not been explicitly programmed. We present computational and human results for
making DRLN more transparent using object saliency visualizations of internal states
and test the effectiveness of expressing saliency through teleological verbal explana-
tions.
1. Introduction
Teamwork is a set of interrelated reasoning, actions and behaviors of each team
member that adaptively combine to fulfill shared team goals (Morgan et al., 1986). Ex-
perimental evidence from high performance human teams resulted in a set of drivers of
team effectiveness (Salas et al., 2005, 2008). These drivers are: team leadership, mu-
tual performance monitoring, backup behaviors (ability to anticipate other team mem-
bers’ needs and shift work and cognitive workload to achieve appropriate balance),
adaptability (ability to adjust strategies and actions based on dynamic changes in mis-
sion and environment), team orientation (taking other’s behavior into account during
group interactions and belief on team goals over individual goals), shared mental mod-
els (organizing knowledge structure of the relationship between tasks and how the team
will perform them), closed loop communication (reliable exchange of information) and
finally and most crucially mutual trust (the shared belief that team members will per-
form their roles and protect the interests of their teammates). As technology enables
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increased machine autonomy, human-machine teaming could acquire the same charac-
teristics as human-human teaming.
Besides being an important ingredient of teamwork, trust has been found to be im-
portant in human use of automation: people tend to rely on automation they trust and
not use automation they do not trust. This has generated sustained interest in concep-
tualizations of trust and its relation to human interaction with automation. Trust has
been defined by Mayer et al. (1995) as “The willingness of a party to be vulnerable
to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform
a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or
control that party.” In the context of trust in automation the above definition has typi-
cally been interpreted as a human’s willingness to rely on automation to perform some
task. Research in human interaction with automation, which we believe is also valid
for human interaction with autonomy, has found that the human may fail to use the
automation when it would be advantageous, called disuse or under-reliance, fail to
monitor it properly when in use, or accept its recommendations and actions when inap-
propriate, called misuse or over-reliance (Lyons & Stokes, 2012). Lee & Moray (1992,
1994); Muir & Moray (2013); Lewandowsky et al. (2000) have shown that trust to-
wards automation can mediate reliance. Additionally, operator trust has been found to
vary dynamically, accumulating over periods of successful performance, then declin-
ing sharply when failures or poor performance are encountered (Lee & Moray, 1994;
Gao & Lee, 2006; Xu & Dudek, 2015).
In social robots, incorrect trust calibration can lead to extreme overtrust as demon-
strated in Robinette et al. (2016) where participants followed the directions of a demon-
strably dysfunctional robot to evacuate a smoke filled room with detrimental results,
including getting directed into closets rather than following exit signs. In other stud-
ies reviewed by Schaefer (2013) trust in social robots increased with matches between
robot appearance and user expectations and were generally higher for less socially
competent robots.
Another characteristic that contributes to both teamwork effectiveness and trust is
transparency. Systems that are more transparent in conveying their reasoning should
be more trusted, since they would be more easily understood by their users (Simpson
et al., 1995; Sycara et al., 1998; Lewis, 1998; Lewis & Heidorn, 1991) and hopefully
their users would be able to better judge their capabilities, thus improving their trust
calibration. Additionally transparency in a human-robot context can be viewed as a
method to establish shared intent and shared awareness between a human and a ma-
chine (Lyons, 2013). Although there are multiple definitions of agent transparency
(Chen et al., 2014; Lyons & Havig, 2014), we use, with minor variation, the defini-
tion proposed by Chen et al. (2014): ”Agent transparency is the quality of an interface
(e.g., visual, linguistic) pertaining to its abilities to afford an operator’s comprehension
about an intelligent agent’s intent, performance, future plans, and reasoning process”.
The goal of transparency is not to relay all of a system’s capabilities, behaviors, and
decision-making rationale to the human. Ideally, agents should relay clear and efficient
information as succinctly as possible, thus enabling the human to maintain a proper
understanding of the system in its tasking environment. The human factors and com-
putational literature (Kim, 2015; Mercado et al., 2016; Ribeiro et al., 2016) has pointed
out the need for system transparency as a way to increase trust in the system.
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As agents become more sophisticated and independent via learning and interaction,
it is critical for their human counterparts to understand their behaviors, the reasoning
process behind those behaviors, and the expected outcomes to properly calibrate their
trust in the systems and make appropriate decisions (de Visser et al., 2014; Lee & See,
2004; Mercado et al., 2016). When interacting with autonomous intelligent agents,
people tend to regard them as intentional individuals and explain their behaviors in
terms of interpersonal relationships (de Graaf & Malle, 2017). That requires an ex-
plainable agent to clarify its actions by offering reasons of beliefs, desires, and inten-
tions (Langley et al., 2017). Indeed, past studies have shown that humans sometimes
question the accuracy and effectiveness of agents’ actions due to the human’s difficul-
ties understanding the state/status of the agent (Bitan & Meyer, 2007; Seppelt & Lee,
2007; Stanton et al., 2007) and the rationales behind the behaviors (Linegang et al.,
2006).
In recent years automation and autonomous system have increasingly relied on Ma-
chine Learning. ML systems are typically used for two broad types of problems. First,
they are used for classification, which relies on supervisory methods with ground truth
given by labelled data, and produces a judgment as to whether an input belongs to a
particular class. Such systems have become ubiquitous in almost all areas of human
endeavor, such as Web services, health care, education, insurance, law enforcement and
defense (Lipron, 2013). Machine learning algorithms make important decisions in our
interactions influencing the news we see, our finances (who gets a loan, or a particular
line of credit), careers (algorithms often filter job applications). Courts have employed
algorithms to predict the probability that an individual relapses into criminal behav-
ior (Choudlechova, 2016). Neural Networks used in classification have revolutionized
computer vision and natural language understanding. Second, ML systems solve se-
quential decision making problems that use mainly unsupervised methods to produce
a series of decisions that would give an optimal reward. These systems work using
Deep Neural Networks for Reinforcement Learning (DRL) where an agent explores
the space of possible strategies in an environment and receives feedback (positive or
negative) on the outcome of choices it makes. Given a particular domain, exploration
allows the agent to form a strategy, called policy, that allows it to generate and follow
a sequence of actions to maximize its payoff (see section 4.1 for related work in this
area). The last few years have witnessed a rapid growth of research and interest in the
domain of deep Reinforcement Learning (RL) due to the significant progress in solving
RL problems (Arulkumaran et al., 2017). Deep RL has been applied to a wide variety
of disciplines ranging from game playing, to robotics to dialogue systems (Silver et al.,
2017; Mnih et al., 2015b; Levine et al., 2016; Kraska et al., 2018; Williams et al., 2017;
Choi et al., 2017).
Self-driving cars that are poised to be deployed in the near future increasingly em-
ploy AI-based object recognition software, and military autonomous systems may be
called to make decisions that cost civilian lives. These systems are more opaque than
their predecessors since they rely almost exclusively on learning form data in order
to shape their conclusions and behavior, as opposed to model-based systems that are
more understandable and often have algorithms that provide formal guarantees of per-
formance. The inner logic and reasoning of DRL systems are opaque and difficult to
be understood even by their own designers.
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The opacity of these systems is becoming increasingly problematic and therefore
there is increasing clamor for transparency in the machine learning community as well
(Kim, 2015; Ribeiro et al., 2016). This need for system transparency has resonated
with policy makers as well. For example, new regulations in the European Union
propose that individuals affected by algorithmic decisions have a right to explanation
(Goodman & Flaxman, 2016).
In this chapter, we discuss the intertwined notions of trust and transparency in the
context of human-agent teamwork. Here agents can be autonomous systems that en-
gage in sequential decision making processes and control, can be computational pro-
cesses that comprise robotic components, such as a vision system for the robot, or
provide information and suggestions to humans. We will present a review of trust and
transparency in the human factors literature emphasizing the need to consider trans-
parency in all dimensions of the trust construct, and then we will turn our attention to
the challenges of transparency for Deep Learning algorithms. We will then present our
own work on transparency for Deep Reinforcement Learning, followed by conclusions
and open research problems.
2. Factors Affecting Trust in Automation
It is generally agreed in the psychological literature that trust is best conceptualized
as a multidimensional psychological attitude involving beliefs and expectations about
the trustee’s trustworthiness derived from experience and interactions with the trustee
(Jones & George, 1998). Although in the literature, the number and concepts in the
trust dimensions vary Jian et al. (2000); Madsen & Gregor (2000), Lee & See (2004)
point out a broad consensus on 3 dimensions they label Purpose (what the automation
is supposed to do), Process (how automation goes about fulfilling its purpose) and
Performance (actual performance). Moreover, it has been found that trust is dynamic
(Lee & Moray, 1994; Lee & See, 2004; Nam et al., 2017, 2019) and a human’s history
of interaction with automation affects future behavior indirectly through changes in
trust.
The most important factors that affect trust in automation are:
(a) System reliability: Prior literature has provided empirical evidence that as au-
tomation reliability declines, human trust declines and vice versa (Hancock et al., 2011;
Moray et al., 2000; Moray & Inagaki, 1999; Riley, 1994; Parasuraman & Manzey,
2010). Additional studies have shown that imperfect (unreliable) automation can have
adverse effects on reliance and compliance (Dixon & Parasuraman, 2006; Meyer, 2004),
and overall system performance de Visser et al. (2006); Dzindolet et al. (2003). Moray
et al. (2000) showed that declining system reliability can lead to systematic decline in
trust and trust expectations, and most crucially, these changes can be measured over
time.
(b) System predictability: Research has shown that when people have prior knowl-
edge of faults, these faults do not necessarily diminish trust in the system (Riley, 1994;
Lewandowsky et al., 2000), possibly due to the fact that knowing how the automa-
tion may fail reduces the uncertainty and consequent risk associated with use of the
automation.
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(c) System intelligibility and transparency: Prior research on trust in automation
found that providing human operators with information related to the reliability of an
automated tool promoted more optimal reliance strategies on the tool (Lyons & Havig,
2014). Further, information related to the limitations of an automated tool aids in trust
recovery following errors of the automation (Choudlechova, 2016). Given that reliabil-
ity of performance is the biggest determiner of trust (Hancock et al., 2011),providing
additional information about performance such as knowledge of results Beck et al.
(2007); Dzindolet et al. (2002) or confidence judgements Dadashi et al. (2013) have
also been widely used to increase trust through greater transparency. The Human Fac-
tors literature has paid less attention to the Purpose and Process components of trust,
most frequently assuming Purpose to be evident. Attention to Process has concentrated
mostly on developing displays for mission-based systems to show the state of the sys-
tem in more transparent ways to allow the human to understand the system (Wang
et al., 2016) or to improve trust calibration (Lyons et al., 2016).
(d) Level of Automation: Another factor that may affect trust in the system is its
level of automation (i.e., the degree to which the system acts on its own). Since higher
levels of automation are more complex, thus potentially more opaque to the operator,
higher levels of automation are frequently (Calhoun et al., 2009; Amato et al., 2011;
Nam et al., 2019; Kira & Potter, 2009) found to engender less trust. To overcome this
deficit transparency becomes more important when the system is more autonomous.
(Oh et al., 2015) In summary, prior literature indicates that a high level of autonomy
may cause the operator to undertrust the system. These implications are echoed in the
distrust and clamor for transparency for systems based on Deep Neural Networks.
3. Trust and Transparency in Human-Autonomy Teaming
Since transparency is an important ingredient of trust, and since trust is multi-
dimensional, we believe that work on transparency should span all trust dimensions,
in particular purpose, process and performance. Additionally, since factors such as De-
gree of Autonomy modulates trust, its influence should also be studied. Transparency
can be viewed as the degree to which automation conveys the basis of its behavior.
Parasuraman et al. (2000) proposed a model characterizing automation as a sequence
of stages which were reduced to two by Wickens (2018): 1) situation assessment and
2) action choice and execution. Transparency effects can usefully be organized by these
stages of autonomy Wickens (2018) and dimensions of trust Chen et al. (2014).
Figure 1 presents constituents of transparency that we briefly discuss in this section
in the context of the trust dimensions of performance, purpose and process (also de-
picted in the figure). Additionally, the figure sketches our explanation model for DRL
agents and shows its relationship with transparency and trust.
Transparency of performance (execution stage) such as system reliability is of-
ten assumed to be directly observable to users yet may be perceived inaccurately. Biros
et al. (2004), for example, found trust and reliance to be influenced by cover stories.
Other studies (Beck et al., 2007) have found supplying knowledge of results to lead to
better trust calibration and improved reliance. Annotating decisions with confidence
judgments is another widely used technique for providing greater insight into system
performance. This has been done in a variety of ways (e.g., by providing probabilities
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Figure 1: A block diagram of the visual and verbal explanations offered by our model of DRL agents and its
relationship with transparency and trust. The model is reported in Section 5.
of success) (Lyons et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2016; Dadashi et al., 2013), confidence in
detection (Dadashi et al., 2013) or expected reward from selected robot action (Wang
et al., 2016).
Transparency of purpose: For pre-programmed automation the system’s purpose
is static and known a priori (purpose transparency was baked in) to the user. As systems
become increasingly autonomous and thus learning and adaptive, their intent/purpose
may change over time and may depend on environmental and social factors. Therefore,
the system’s intent must be communicated to the human to help the human understand
and anticipate system activities. To do this, the system must be able to introspect, (i.e.,
be aware of its own goals, preferences and what factors bring change to them). For
example, a system might change its intent in response to a perceived change in intent
of the human with whom the system is teaming.
In experiments with humans, the system’s purpose is almost always informally
conveyed through instructions or the demand characteristics of an experiment, however,
when explicitly manipulated, as in Sadler et al. (2016) effects on trust and reliance were
found. More commonly, experiments involving transparency of automation do not
discriminate between stages of automation or form of explanation. They instead mix
categories often in an additive manner such as Verberne et al. (2012) which started with
an unsupported recommendation in the control condition (execution stage), increased
transparency of performance by conveying expected risk in the second condition, and
added an explanation (situation assessment stage) involving process in the third.
Transparency of process (situation assessment stage): While trust and the de-
cision to rely on or comply with an autonomous agent may depend on knowledge of
its purpose or reliability, the reciprocal interactions needed for teamwork depend cru-
cially on the ability to predict and coordinate behavior (i.e., knowledge of process). In
the current human factors literature, transparency of process involves conveying infor-
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mation to the human about the system’s decision making process to support operator
situation awareness (Chen et al., 2014; Lee & See, 2004). Increased information, such
as explanations by an agent, may have a complicated effect on operators’ workload.
Although a human may need to process more information from an agent with high
transparency, this information might be desired in order to achieve better performance.
Therefore, additional information may help operators to understand the intentions and
behaviors of an agent and correct their expectation and trust in it without increasing
workload (Chen & Barnes, 2014). Recent work has confirmed the above argument in
multi-unmanned-vehicle control task scenarios (Mercado et al., 2016).
The reasoning (transparency of process) of pre-programmed automation, though
not necessarily known to the user a priori, was easier to convey. For example, a rule-
based system can display its set of rules to allow a human to see its reasoning. A
very early example of this was Teiresias (Davis, 1978) that explained its reasoning by
showing the rule chain that led to its conclusions. Even for more sophisticated systems
that may use (e.g., Bayesian processes, or decision trees), the system’s reasoning is
relatively easy to convey.
The broad use of purely data-driven AI/ML techniques raises additional challenges
that necessitate a more refined look at the concept of transparency and trust. If the
data is biased, the system may come to the wrong conclusions although its algorithm
operates correctly. In a well known example of such behavior, the data used by an
image classification system inadvertently included images of wolves only in snowy
backgrounds (Ribeiro et al., 2016). When the system was given an image of a wolf in
a non-snowy background, it misclassified it as a dog. Only after the system designers
searched for the cause, they discovered it was due not to a faulty algorithm but to biased
data. In this particular case, recognizing the mistake was easy (finding the cause was
not so easy), however in other situation (e.g., system decisions on recidivism or ex-
tending credit), even recognition of faulty system conclusions is not easy. Besides data
biases, adversarial data manipulation is also a major source of concern. Convolutional
Neural Networks (CNNs), used for image classification, are susceptible to adversarial
manipulation that causes them to misclassify images that seem only imperceptibly per-
turbed to a human (Szegedy et al., 2013). Their paper shows examples of images that
were slightly perturbed by adversarial noise (imperceptible to the human eye) including
a yellow school bus and a white dog that were both misclassified as ostriches!. Thus,
for these systems to be trusted, they should be transparent in terms of being auditable
as to possible biases in the data and robust to adversarial manipulation. This notion of
auditability as a characteristic of transparency has also been found in the human factors
literature where increases in compliance was found from providing means of verifying
automation decisions (Bliss et al., 1996). Making progress towards discovering and
correcting biases and also discovering and protecting systems from adversarial data
manipulation are open research problems in the AI/ML community.
Besides auditability of decisions, transparency can also be considered in terms of
interpetability and explainability. Interpretability enables understanding of the me-
chanics of the algorithm, whereas explainability enables producing post hoc explana-
tions or predictions of the model without necessarily elucidating the mechanisms by
which the model works (Lipton, 2016). Both interpetabilty and explainability, like
trust and transparency, also lack formal definitions and characterizations. There is in-
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creasing interest in the AI community of providing those and developing techniques for
understanding them. In section 5, we present our own work on transparent/explainable
Deep Reinforcement Learning using object-based saliencey maps.
3.1. Types of Explanations
Explanations are conventionally categorized as:
• Teleological or functional (WHY): Explanations for transparency may be tele-
ological (why) which may be incomplete, conveying simply relevant features
of the situation contributing to an automation decision (Wright et al., 2016) or
complete in supplying both features and logic behind the decision. Teleological
explanations are preferred by humans (Lombrozo, 2006) who are strongly pre-
disposed to attribute causality (Thines, 1991) even in its absence. We have strong
predispositions to attribute causality as shown in Michotte’s classic experiments
reported by Thines (1991) in which subjects interpreted the motions of abstract
geometric objects as elastic collisions or animate behaviors such as chasing or
leading depending on timing and proximity of objects. Explanations of more
abstract behavior typically appeal to causes as well, with knowledge of general
patterns constraining which causes are judged probable and relevant Lombrozo
(2006) in much the way timing and proximity do for perception. When explana-
tions are judged for quality the presence of a general pattern is typically preferred
to probability judgments alone while this pattern is required to be both general
and relevant (appropriate to the actors and event). So, for example, an expla-
nation that ”a robot turned left to avoid a collision” would be preferable to an
explanation that the turn was taken to increase the robot’s long term probability
of reaching a goal, although both might be correct. Similarly, citing the presence
of a wall (often present preceding turns) or distance from door (a serendipitous
feature of the robot’s history) as cause would fail the probable and relevant test
since walls were often present when turns did not occur (not relevant) and dis-
tance from door does not reference a humanly known general pattern for evoking
turns (not probable). Moreover, this explanation implicitly includes the the do-
main knowledge that collisions are undesirable, that the robot had learned to
avoid collisions, and that collision is threatened by a trajectory leading the robot
into the wall.
• Efficient or mechanistic (HOW): the primary source of an action “the robot’s
programming caused it to turn”. Although this explanation has implicit the state
of the world at the time of the turn, it is not relevant or useful to the human.
Mechanistic explanations can drill down by chaining together a series of inter-
mediate steps so the answer might be elaborated to include that what the robot
sensed caused its programming to produce an observed preference value leading
it to turn.
• Formal or constitutive (WHAT): expressing a necessary aspect of an object or
event or conveying part-whole relationships. For example, the What explanation
of the robot taking a turn may be, ”The robot took 5 steps forward, turned its
orientation to the left, took 5 steps forward”.
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From this perspective teamwork involving robots trained through DRL presents a
dilemma. An understanding of process needed to predict behavior, remains hidden
within the layers of the network. The accuracy of our predictions of robot actions
therefore, depend on the correspondence between our own attributions of causality
and the policies the robot has learned. As summarized by Lombrozo (2006) these
attributions are predominantly based on probability and relevance. In the case of the
game Ms. Pac-Man, for example, relevance would revolve around the rules of the game
in which Pac-Man gains points by eating pellets and avoiding ghosts. The DRL player,
however, does not benefit from predefined relevance and learns from scratch to find the
optimal policy through trial and error. Therefore, while the resulting policy has been
trained to win the game it will not necessarily choose the same actions as a human,
making attribution difficult. Recently, the AI community has studied the effects of
including domain knowledge in the form of relevant features. Although this may limit
generality of learning, since some features may be predetermined, it may help system
explainability.
In the context of teamwork, not only should the system be transparent to the user,
but also the human should be transparent to the system. In other words, the system
should be able to make inferences about human intent (purpose), human beliefs and
how these beliefs may lead to actions (process) prediction of human actions (perfor-
mance). Such understanding on the part of the system is equivalent to the system
formulating a Theory of Mind of the human that would allow it to adapt to human’s be-
havior thus improving teamwork performance. Such a Theory of Mind will allow the
agent to better understand why a human may be taking a particular action, understand
when the human may have false beliefs (e.g., due to lack of information to environment
changes) and inform the human of missing information that the agent may have, so as
to correct the human’s false beliefs.
4. Background on RL and Deep RL
Reinforcement learning solves the sequential decision making problems by learn-
ing from experience. In Reinforcement Learning (RL), an agent interacts with an envi-
ronment ε over discrete time steps and receives feedback (rewards) on the outcome of
choices is makes. Given a state, the agent selects actions in order to maximize future
rewards. In the RL setting the problem can be modelled as a Markov Decision Process
(MDP) represented by the 5-tuple (S,A,T,R,γ), where S is the state space, A is the
action space, T (s′|s,a) is the state transition probability function, R(s,a) is the reward
function and γ ∈ [0,1] is the discount factor. Due to stochasticity, a policy pi : S→ A
maps every state to a distribution over actions. In the time step t, the agent receives a
state st ∈ S and selects an action at ∈ A according to its policy pi , where S and A denote
the sets of all possible states and actions respectively. After executing the action, the
agent receives a scalar reward rt and enters the next state st+1.
The goal of the agent is to choose actions to maximize its rewards over time. In
other words, the action selection implicitly considers the future rewards. The total
discounted return is defined as Rt = ∑∞τ=t γτ−trτ where γ ∈ [0,1] is a discount factor
that trades-off the importance of recent and future rewards.
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Policy based methods directly model the policy (Williams, 1992), while in value-
based RL methods, the action value (a.k.a., Q-value) is commonly estimated by a func-
tion approximator, such as a deep neural network (Mnih et al., 2015a). The actor-critic
Sutton & Barto (1998) architecture is a combination of value-based and policy-based
methods.
The value function V pi(st) is the expected discounted sum of rewards by follow-
ing policy pi from state st at time t, V pi(st) = E[∑Ti=0 γ irt+i]. Similarly, the Q-value
(action-value) Qpi(st ,a) is the expected return starting from state st , taking action a and
then following pi . The Q-value function can be recursively estimated using the Bell-
man equation Qpi(st ,a) = E[rt +γ maxa′Q(st+1,a′)] and pi∗ is the optimal policy which
achieves the highest Qpi(st ,a) over all policies pi .
In the reinforcement learning community the action value function Q is computed
via a typically linear function approximator, but in Deep Reinforcement learning, the
function approximator is a (nonlinear) neural network. Deep neural networks have
been recently applied in reinforcement learning (RL) to achieve human-level control
policies in various challenging domains. The rich representations given by a deep
neural network improve the efficiency of reinforcement learning (RL) at the expense
of requiring a vast amount of training data. If a high fidelity simulator is available
(e.g., Zhu et al. (2016) which describes the appearance of the real-world as closely as
possible), such data can be easily generated.
The advantages of deep RL are (a) the features do not need to be hand-crafted but
are learned during training, (b) deep neural networks have shown superior performance
in many challenging domains, and (c) the algorithm is model-free (i.e., it solves the
reinforcement learning task directly using sample data without explicitly estimating
the reward and transition dynamics).
The challenges of this approach are: (a) large amounts of data are needed, (b) RL
with nonlinear function approximator as a neural network could be unstable (or even
diverge). This is due to different causes, such as the correlation present in the sequence
of observations, the fact that small updates to the value function may significantly
change the policy, and the existence of correlations between action values (Q) and the
target reward values
DRL differs from image classification in a number of ways: In classification, for
each image, the system has to predict its label whereas for DRL the system must learn
a function that maps state-value pairs to Q-values that capture the dynamics of the
system over time. If the state in DRL is a single image, the dynamics of the system are
not captured. Therefore, a state must be represented by a sequence of images. Current
works on DQNs for Atari games use only 4 previous screens as input to learn the reward
for each state.
Although Deep RL is much more challenging than classification, in the past few
years a new variant of Deep RL has been developed and tested mainly on Atari games
(Mnih et al., 2013) where the states are the input screens of the game. The agent
chooses an action from the possible control actions (e.g., up/down/left/right/). After
that, the agent receives a reward (how much the score increases or decreases) and the
next image input. The deep RL agent, only reasoning on the image pixels and the game
scores show performance comparable or higher to an expert human player (Mnih et al.,
2015b). However, producing explanations has been out of scope for Deep RL until
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recently but interest in interpetability and explainability is increasing (Lipton, 2016).
Developing methods to enable autonomous agents to be transparent is very chal-
lenging, because ease of transparency seems to be inversely proportional to agent so-
phistication. However, DNNs are extremely opaque (i.e., they cannot produce human
understandable accounts of their reasoning processes or explanations). Therefore, there
is a clear need for deep RL agents to dynamically and automatically offer explanations
that users can understand and act upon.
4.1. Related Work on Computational Models
The literature on deep reinforcement learning is fast increasing. Here we briefly
review work that is most relevant to this chapter. Multiple deep RL algorithms have
been developed to incorporate both on-policy RL such as Sarsa (Rummery & Niran-
jan, 1994), actor-critic methods (Sutton & Barto, 1998) and off-policy RL such as Q-
learning (Watkins, 1989), or combination of RL and experience replay memory (Mnih
et al., 2015a; Riedmiller, 2005). A parallel RL paradigm (van Hasselt et al., 2015) has
also been proposed to reduce the heavy reliance of deep RL algorithms on specialized
hardware or distributed architectures. The deep Q-network (DQN) model proposed
in Mnih et al. (2015a) combines Q-learning with a flexible deep neural network. More
specifically, recent work has found outstanding performance of deep reinforcement
learning models on Atari 2600 games using only raw pixels to make game control de-
cisions (Mnih et al., 2015a). DQN can reach human-level performance on many of
Atari 2600 games. However, DQN suffers from substantial over-estimation in some
games. van Hasselt et al. (2015) thus proposes Double Q-learning algorithm that can
be generalized to work with large-scale function approximation. A dueling network
architecture (Wang et al., 2015) has been proposed to decouple the state-action values
into state values and action values. The experiments of Mnih et al. (2016) show that
the actor-critic (A3C) method surpasses the current state-of-the-art in the Atari game
domain. In contrast to Q-learning, A3C is a policy-based model that learns a network
action policy. However, for game settings with many objects where each object has
a different role in reward computation, A3C does not perform very well. Therefore,
Lample & Chaplot (2016) propose a method that augments performance of reinforce-
ment learning by exploiting game feature information.
In human-robot interaction and teaming, robots and humans must adapt to one an-
other. This requires the robots to maintain a computational cognitive model of their
human co-workers in the task environment. There is a body of work on making intel-
ligent robots able to 1) adapt to physical human behaviors (Liu et al., 2016), 2) infer
human’s intent (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016; Dorsa Sadigh et al., 2017) and 3) shape
the way how humans reason about robots (Huang et al., 2019; Zhou et al., 2017; Pez-
zulo et al., 2013). Previous research assumes the human is a perfect collaborator and
uses Bayesian inference to predict the human’s next goal in order for the robot to adapt
accordingly (Liu et al., 2016). Subsequent work by Hadfield-Menell et al. (2016) ex-
tends the scope to situations where robots do not know the human operators’ reward
function and need to learn it over the course of interaction. Inverse Reinforcement
Learning (Ng et al., 2000; Ramachandran & Amir, 2007) approaches this problem
from a passive learning perspective like learning from demonstrations offline, while in
Cooperative Inverse Reinforcement Learning (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016) the human
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helps the robot learn by making his/her behavior more transparent. Alternately, by
maintaining a model of human mental states, the robot may take informative actions to
communicate its goals (Pezzulo et al., 2013), reward functions (Huang et al., 2019), or
confidence levels (Zhou et al., 2017) to humans.
Ideally, we would like to develop techniques for DRL explanations that explain (a)
why an action was taken (teleology), (b) why this action was taken as opposed to other
ones (counterfactuals), and (c) why a sequence of actions was taken (plans).
5. Object-Saliency Based Explainability in Deep RL
Most current work around interpretability in deep learning is based on local ex-
planations (i.e., explaining network predictions for specific input examples (Lipton,
2016)). Saliency maps are used to generate local explanations. Saliency maps gener-
ally use gradient-like information to identify salient parts of the image and highlight
important regions of the input that influence the output of the neural network. Zahavy
et al. (2016) use the Jacobian of the network to compute saliency maps on a Q-value
network. Perturbation based saliency maps using a continuous mask across the image
and also using object segmentation based masks have been studied in the context of
deep-RL (Greydanus et al., 2017). Our object-based saliency method (Iyer et al., 2018;
Li et al., 2017) that we present in 5.1 belongs to this category.
In contrast, global explanations attempt to understand the mapping learned by a
neural network regardless of the input. There are additional difficulties with global
explanations since there are problems of generalization and memorization. Recent
findings suggest that deep RL agents can easily memorize large amounts of training
data with drastically varying test performance and are vulnerable to adversarial attacks
(Zhang et al., 2018a,b; Huang et al., 2017). We have explored interpetability using
global explanations in Annasamy & Sycara (2019). Our method aims to understand
aspects of the input space (images) that are captured in the latent space across inputs.
In particular, given a particular action (e.g., Pac-Man goes left) and expected returns
(e.g., rewards of 50 points), our method tries to understand visually which would be the
features of the corresponding states. This could help in implicitly identifying underly-
ing relations between the entities in these states, (e.g., the network might have learned
that presence of a ghost in the vicinity of Pac-Man would be a had thing that must be
avoided). However, our results suggest that the features extracted by the convolutional
layers are extremely shallow and can easily overfit to trajectories seen during training,
rather than generalize to trajectories that would be in conformance with real relations
among entities.
In the following section we present a short description of our recent work on ex-
plainability in DRL, using the game of Pac-Man. In this work, we have explored bot
visualization and text as means of producing local explanations of agent (Pac-Man)
behavior.
5.1. Visual Explanation
In Atari games, the DRL network is supposed to implicitly learn all relevant fea-
tures that capture the agent’s reasoning and behavior. However, this does not aid ex-
plainability to humans. Since humans recognize objects, our idea was to enhance the
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neural network with object recognition ability as a way to get a handle on relevance of
different objects for the DRL agent’s decision making. We first used template match-
ing, a computer vision technique (Brunelli, 2009) to recognize objects in images. The
technique works by taking a template image (the patch) and sliding it through a source
image (up to down, left to right) and calculating the current source image similarity to
the template image. After object recognition, we used object channels to incorporate
features of objects in the input images to the DRL network.
The object channels as well as the original image are given to the network as input.
The network outputs (predicts) Q-values for each action. This method can be used
incorporated into different existing deep reinforcement learning algorithms, such as
DQN or ACC.
(a) Screenshot of
the State
(b) Pixel Saliency
Map
(c) Object
Saliency Map
Figure 2: An example of original state, corresponding pixel saliency map and object saliency map produced
by a double DQN agent in the game “Ms. Pac-Man.”
Our method to provide transparency for Deep Neural Networks is called object
saliency maps. A saliency map highlights regions of the input that, if changed, would
most influence the output (Simonyan et al., 2013). Saliency maps is an ex post facto
local explanation method. This means that after the network has been trained, query
images can be input that may help the user predict what the network was paying atten-
tion to (ie. ”explain) so as to help the user understand the system’s reasoning and also
possibly predict the system’s next decision. Object saliency maps provide visualization
of the decisions made by RL agents. These visualizations aim to be intelligible to hu-
mans. To generate intelligible visualizations that would help with explanations of DQN
agent behaviors, we need to determine which pixels the model pays attention to when
making a decision (Simonyan et al., 2013). Another interpretation of computing pixel
saliency is that the value of the derivative indicates which pixels need to be changed
the least to affect the Q-value.
However, pixel-level representations are not intelligible to people. Figure 2(a)
shows a screenshot from the game Ms.Pac-Man. Figure 2(b) is the corresponding pixel
saliency map produced by an agent trained with the Double DQN(DDQN) model. The
agent chooses to go right in this situation. Although we can get some intuition of
which area the deep RL agent is looking at to make the decision, it is not clear what
objects the agent is looking at and why it chooses to move right. On the other hand,
Figure 2 makes more intelligible the objects that the DQN is paying attention to. To
understand the influence of objects on agent decisions, we need to rank the objects
13
in a state s based on their effect on Q(s,a). In the game of Pac-Man, there are static
pellets/dots that Pac-Man eats to get points. There are ghosts that chase and eat the
Pac-Man, which finishes the game and gives a large number of negative points. There
are super-pellets and cherries that appear dynamically, and if Pac-Man eats them then
it gets more points. Moreover, if Pac-Man eats a cherry then, the ghosts become edible
for some time, so if the Pac-Man manages to eat an edible ghosts it gets a very high
reward (many points).
For each object O found in s, we mask the object with background color to form a
new state so as if the object does not appear in this new state. We calculate the Q-values
for both states, and the difference w of the Q-values actually represents the influence
of this object on Q(s,a). So, if w is positive the object has a positive influence which
means the the object gives positive future reward to the agent (the positive objects are
shown in dark in the saliency maps). Negative w represents “bad” object since after we
remove the object, the Q-value gets improved.
Figure 2(c) shows an example of the object saliency map that clearly shows which
objects the model is paying attention to and the relative importance (via shading) of
each object.
5.1.1. Human Experiments
In order to test whether the object saliency map visualization can help humans un-
derstand the learned behavior of Pac-Man, we performed an initial set of experiments.
The goals of the experiment were to: 1) test whether object saliency maps contain
enough information to allow humans to match them with corresponding game scenar-
ios, 2) test whether participants could use object saliency maps to generate reasonable
explanations of the behavior of the Pac-Man and 3) test whether object saliency maps
allow participants to correctly predict the Pac-Man’s next action. This requires a deeper
causal understanding of what may influence the Pac-Man in his decisions.
(a) Screen-shots (b) Object Saliency Maps
Figure 3: An example of the stimulus materials participants saw on trial 9 of the prediction task. 75%
participants in the screen-shot group thought Pac-Man would go left to eat the cherry at the left side. 60%
participants in the object saliency maps group predicted the Pac-Man would keep going down for the dark
elements (the pellets) below.
Experiments were conducted in a graduate and undergraduate Human Factors class.
The forty participants were approximately equally divided by gender and between 20-
29 years old. The Matching and Prediction tasks were presented sequentially over a
period of 30-45 minutes.
Matching Task In each trial, the participants are shown twice, a 5-second video
clip of Pac-Man gameplay generated by O-DDQN. During the video clip, Pac-Man de-
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cides and takes particular actions. The last decision made produces the crucial move-
ment of the clip (e.g., Pac-Man moves right), with the clip ending just after the crucial
movement. Three frames from the object saliency map are then shown to participants
(see Fig. 3(b)). The center frame is the frame where the Pac-Man makes the cru-
cial decision and the other two are frames from before and after that moment. In the
task, participants are asked to judge whether the saliency maps accurately represent the
video they just saw. In the matching cases, the saliency maps indeed were generated
from the video clip the participant saw. In the non-matching cases, the three saliency
map frames were generated from a different video clip. In distractor/non-matching
clips, the Pac-Man occupies the same area of map as in the target video, but makes
different movements. This is done to avoid the case where the participants solely focus
on the location of the Pac-Man as a matching criterion, disregarding the movements
and environmental factors.
Following the match decision, if the participants’ answer is ”match”, they are asked
to give an explanation for the Pac-Man’s movements based on the video and saliency
maps. In other words, participants are asked to provide a teleological explanation ex-
plaining ‘why’ Pac-Man acted as she did. For example, ”Pac-Man moved up to eat
more energy pellets while avoiding the ghost coming from below.”
The matching task consisted of 2 training trials and 20 test trials, half (10 trials)
presenting matched video and saliency maps, the other half presenting non-matched
pairs in a single randomly ordered sequence. Dependent variables were correctness of
matches and agreement between explanations and saliency maps.
Prediction Task In each trial, the participants are shown a video clip not used in
the matching task. Each clip ends at the point where the Pac-Man must choose a crucial
move. The participants are divided equally into two experimental conditions. In the
screen-shot condition, after the video clip, participants see 3 actual screen-shots from
the video ending before the crucial move is taken. In the object saliency map condition,
the participants see three object saliency map frames (corresponding to the screen-shot
frames) after viewing the video clip (see Fig. 3). At the decision point in the third
frame Pac-Man’s choices (up, down, left, right) may be limited by barriers indicated on
the response forms. Participants are asked to predict Pac-Man’s movement among the
feasible directions based on the three previous frames (screenshots or saliency maps),
and then give an explanation for their prediction which includes their judgment as
to which elements of the game influenced the Pac-Man’s decision (indicating these
elements by circling them on a hardcopy of the screenshot or saliency map), and explain
why Pac-Man made that decision.
The prediction task consisted of 2 training trials and 10 test trials. Each participant
was assigned to either the screenshot group or the saliency map group. Dependent vari-
ables include whether predictions were correct, and whether explanations were consis-
tent with the saliency maps.
Results The average matching accuracy of the participants was 61.0% (SD= 14.0%).
A learning effect was found with participants having higher accuracy (65.5%) in the
last half of the trials than the first half (56.5%) (t(39) = 3.10, p = 0.04). Comparing
hit and false alarm rates, participants reported more ”matches” when the video and im-
age stimulus matched (t(18) = 2.91, p < 0.001). If the 40 participants are treated as a
binary classifier and the percentage of their answers as an output score, a receiver oper-
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Figure 4: ROC curve of the matching task, AUC =
0.81.
Figure 5: The mean accuracy of participants in each
test cases of the prediction task. Error bars are one
Standard Error from Means.
ating characteristic (ROC) curve (Fawcett, 2006) can be plotted for true positive rates
versus false positive rates across a range of threshold parameters (as Fig. 4 shows).
The area under the curve is 0.81 which indicates a good classification between match-
ing and non-matching situations. In summary, human participants were able to link the
object saliency maps with the game scenarios.
For the more difficult prediction task, there was no significant difference in accu-
racy between the object saliency map group (58.0%±12.8%) and the control group(56.5%±
10.4%). However, the main effect of trials (F(9,342) = 11.18, p < 0.001) and the in-
teraction between trials and groups (F(9,342) = 2.72, p = 0.005) were both highly
significant suggesting that characteristics of the trials had a strong influence on perfor-
mance. Thus we conducted a simple effect analysis to examine differences among the
10 test scenarios (see Fig. 5). Results show that the screen-shot group has high pre-
dictive accuracy in test 2 (p = 0.027), while the object saliency map group has higher
accuracy in tests 3 and 9 (p = 0.007, p = 0.025). Those three trials can help provide
a deeper insight into the mechanism of how object saliency maps could help humans
understand Pac-Man’s learned behavior.
Trial 9 provides a good example (see Fig. 3). The Pac-Man goes down and faces a
dilemma whether to turn left or keep going down. 60% participants who saw the object
saliency maps predicted Pac-Man would continue going down, and objects circled and
explanations focused on the dark elements or dots below. In contrast, 75% participants
in the screen-shot group predicted Pac-Man would go left, and all except one of their
explanations mentioned the cherry at the left side. In the scenarios generated by O-
DDQN, the Pac-Man did go down for the dots. Trial 9 is a typical case in which
there are multiple influencing elements and it is hard for humans to predict Pac-Man’s
behavior based on information from the game screen and their own knowledge of the
rules and ideas about gameplay. However, displaying object saliency enables us to
directly identify those objects affecting the program’s decision. In other situations
when the Pac-Man may make what we judge to be suboptimal choices (e.g., the Pac-
Man chose a wrong direction and was eaten by a ghost), an object saliency map could
be crucial to helping users and system developers understand some of the rationale
behind such behaviors and the saliency map can be used as a debugging tool.
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5.2. Natural Language Explanation
To present information from object saliency maps in a form more consistent with
human reasoning we developed algorithms to generate relevance-sensitive textual ex-
planations for DRL networks. We developed focused verbal explanation models of
the DRL system in which verbal explanations referred to objects expected to be most
important in influencing the agent’s selection of next action. Prior work in generating
explanations for RL systems has been limited with direct translation of policies (Hayes
& Shah, 2017) restricted to simple cases while more complex environments such as
Atari games (Ehsan et al., 2017) have relied on human attributions. Our approach is
intermediate basing explanation on internal information but restricting its expression
to a teleological form with relations satisfying human criteria for relevance. Our initial
rule-based model was constructed based on prior knowledge of the Ms. Pac-Man game
and its rules and consisted of a collection of allowable expressions. Object salience
and valence were used to match information encoded in a saliency map with a verbal
explanation. Although the rule-based model is capable of generating reasonable expla-
nations, it lacks the generalizability and flexibility that a neural network might provide
in addressing unexpected situations. To overcome the limitations of the rule-based
model, a learning model was also developed in order to : 1) be more generalizable in
terms of game episodes 2) be more tolerant to input noise 3) to provide explanation
for future states and actions, which could help the user predict and plan. Game image,
agent position map, and object saliency map act as the input for both models. Data
generated by the rule-based model was employed to train the learning model, which
consisted of two parts: an encoder for feature extraction, and a decoder for generating
the explanation in natural language using an attention mechanism. The challenge for
the learning model lies in extracting distinguishable features from DRL systems, es-
pecially from images with high structural similarity, such as a game image with fixed
board or fixed map, which can not be fully solved by current networks.
5.2.1. Rule-based Verbal Explanation Model
The input of the rule-based model is game images and corresponding object saliency
maps. The output is a verbal explanation for the given game state. The pre-defined rules
and workflow used in this model were designed based on literature and a previous user
study (Iyer et al., 2018). The design of the rule-based system was based on a number
of assumptions. (i) Object priority: Since different objects in the game give Pac-Man
different rewards (e.g., being eaten by the ghost means Packamn dies, eating a ghost
when it becomes edible gives high positive reward), the explanation should focus on
high-value objects (positive or negative). From Pakman’s rules the value of objects is
ghost, edible ghost, cherry, pellet, and dot. (ii) Attention area: User tests confirmed
that participants only consider a limited area relatively close to Pac-Man when ex-
plaining its actions. this is reasonable since the Pac-Man and ghosts move only one
step at a time and the rest of the objects are static, with the exception of cherries that
appear and disappear dynamically. Therefore we consider only a limited area of atten-
tion with limited number of objects for the verbal explanation. (iii) Action accordance
The expected action of Pac-Man should be approaching beneficial objects and avoid-
ing ghosts. However, there are situations where Pac-Man has to leave beneficial object
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in order to avoid ghost or Pac-Man has to approach ghost in order to chase beneficial
objects. The action of Pac-Man is divided into two classes, considering consistent or
inconsistent with expectations. Class #1 means the action of Pac-Man is in accordance
with the expectation. Class #2 means the action is in contrast with the expectation.
(iv) Language style To make the explanation more natural we created sentences that
describe the Pac-Man’s actions (moving directions) followed by the objects that moti-
vate the current action. Relative coordination is employed to indicate the position of
objects with relation to Pac-Man. An explanation template was designed accordingly.
For example, a typical sentence is ”The Pac-Man moves up to eat the dot above her”.
5.2.2. Learning-based Verbal Explanation Model
The learning model consists of two stages. The first stage is image processing in
order to get the game image feature map. The second stage generates verbal content
based on the image process result. The Image encoder encodes game image, Pac-Man
position map, and object saliency map for the verbal decoder. The three input chan-
nels provide information from different aspects: Game image provides environment
information. Pac-Man position map contains Pac-Man location information and the
object saliency map provides the saliency weight of each object. The Verbal decoder
generates a verbal description consistent with the image encoder output. A sequence
generation model generates verbal explanations verbatim. An attention mechanism
then selects the most salient output from the encoder. To capture dynamic game infor-
mation five previous frames of the game image, five previous frames of the Pac-Man
position map, and a frame of the object saliency map serve as input. A verbal explana-
tion derived from the game image is generated as output.
5.2.3. Experimental Results
In this part, both the verbal explanation of rule-base model and learning model are
quantitatively evaluated.
Figure 6: Subjects satisfaction score. Figure 7: The mean accuracy of participants.
User tests. User tests were conducted in our laboratory and through Mechanical Turk
to validate the appropriateness and effectiveness of both the rule-based and learning-
based explanation generation models.
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Experimental design. The matching and prediction tasks were conducted in a labora-
tory environment with 17 paid participants recruited from the University of Pittsburgh
community. The Task settings and game episodes were identical to those used in the
earlier evaluation of object-saliency maps, except some stimulus materials were re-
placed with natural language explanations generated by the rule-based model.
The second task to evaluate the acceptability of DNN generated explanations was
conducted online using Amazon Mechanical Turk. The online questionnaire consisted
of an introduction section and two evaluation tasks. The introduction contained ba-
sic background knowledge about the Ms. Pac-Man game, object saliency maps and
the language generation model. On each trial participants reported their satisfaction
with an explanation presented either visually (saliency map) or verbally (rule-based
or learning-based). In the visual evaluation trials, a game screen-shot and the corre-
sponding object saliency map were presented. In the verbal evaluation trials, a natural
language explanation generated by either the rule-based or learning based model was
given in addition to the two images. Responses were collected on a Likert scale ranging
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
The 10 trials on each task contained randomly selected scenarios from the game
episodes played by DRL. The sequence of two tasks and trials in each task was ran-
domized to counterbalance the learning effect. For the rule-based and learning models,
tests were conducted separately on different groups of participants to avoid interfer-
ence. The questionnaire was deployed on Qualtircs.com for public access.
Results. The performance of matching and prediction participants was compared di-
rectly with the historical data from the previous experiment. There was no significant
difference between natural language explanation and the object-saliency visualization.
For the online questionnaire, 150 samples are kept after removing abnormal data.
For the rule-based model, the average rating of verbal and visual tasks were 5.11±
0.07 (Mean ± Standard Error) and 4.89±0.09, respectively. Paired T-test showed that
the rule-based verbal explanations received significant higher subjective ratings than
object saliency maps, t(74) = 2.989, p= .004. For the learning model, a similar pattern
appears suggesting that learning-based verbal explanations (5.08±0.10) are better than
o-saliency maps (4.93±0.10) in terms of users’ satisfaction, t(74) = 2.020, p = .047.
The results are shown in figures 6 and 7.
Our results indicate that verbal explanations consistent with human preferences
for teleological explanation are found more satisfactory than visual saliency maps that
do not respect this preference. However, in terms of matching or prediction accuracy
there were no significant differences between the natural language explanations and the
saliency maps from which they were derived.
6. Conclusions
In this chapter we present issues involving trust and transparency arising in in hu-
man interactions with autonomy that uses AI and Machine Learning algorithms. Sec-
tions 1-3 review literature on trust and transparency for conventional automation in
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order to extrapolate to what may be expected as we move from systems which auto-
mate a relatively narrow range of actions to autonomous agents/robots with substan-
tially larger action spaces. We argue that as the degree of automation (extent to which
system output is controlled by machine rather than human) increases, transparency of
the automation usually decreases. Adopting Wickens (2018) simplified two stage (in-
put/output) model of automation we argue that transparency (added information) at the
input stage contributes more to making a system predictable than transparency at the
output stage. So, a display showing the proximity of targets, for example, would be
a greater help in predicting the behavior of an automated weapon than assurance or
experience that the weapon is 90% effective although either might lead to a decision to
rely on the automation. A convergent literature on explanation from psychology sug-
gests that humans have a strong preference for teleological (causal) explanations and
are more likely to use such models to guide their actions. From these observations we
suggest that an AI/robot’s ability to provide or support teleological explanations of its
behavior will likely be crucial to to effective human-robot interaction and teaming.
The remainder of the chapter is devoted to examining the consequences for inter-
acting with Deep Reinforcement Learning systems which use very high dimensional,
nonlinear embeddings to generate their behavior. While DRL produces highly effec-
tive performers achieving equal or better than human performance they are opaque and
often make choices baffling to humans. In a series of studies we examine mechanisms
which might make DRL behavior more transparent. The first study supports trans-
parency by making the input used by the system visible to the user in a manner similar
to the automated weapon’s display of target proximity. While participants were able to
associate saliency maps with corresponding screen shots, their ability to predict Pac-
Man’s next action based on the most influential objects/regions in the display was not
significantly greater than chance. A trial by trial examination shows that while saliency
maps improved predictions substantially in some cases in others it depressed them.
The second set of experiments addressed the question of whether constraining ex-
planations to teleological form could make them more effective and usable. To gen-
erate explanations, objects with high salience and their valence were matched against
hypothesized rules governing Pac-Man behavior. So, for example, in a saliency map
in which pellets below the Pac-Man had the highest salience and positive valence the
situation might be re-expressed as, ’the Pac-Man is attracted by the pellets below’. The
verbal teleological descriptions of saliency map contents performed no better than the
maps themselves on the matching and prediction tasks. Because many of the collected
episodes of DRL gameplay could not be translated by matching to rules, a second DRL
network was trained using the matches as labeled examples. Mechanical Turk workers
rated explanations generated by this DRL as satisfactory as those generated by match-
ing to rules and felt both to be more interpretable than the saliency maps. Performance
on the matching and prediction tasks, however, did not vary across conditions. These
experiments suggest that while DRL networks learn to play games such as Pac-Man
with a high level of skill, what they have learned and how they play may seem quite
alien to a human observer. When provided with a series of screen shots or saliency
maps our participants readily attributed desires such as eating pellets or avoiding ghosts
to the Pac-Man yet predicting actions on this basis worked no better than chance. If we
are to take advantage of the strength of DRL performance in human-robot interaction
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or human-autonomy teaming this gulf between how we view problems and how they
come to be solved by a learner with massive experience but none of our knowledge
must be bridged. Until then we may come to trust DRL systems based on performance
alone but won’t be able to predict their actions or realize when they are wrong.
As the development and penetration of these systems into society increases, and
as vulnerabilities of these opaque systems are identified, there is a tremendous need
for (a) formulating rigorous definitions of transparency, (b) identifying dimensions of
transparency and algorithms for making those dimensions operational to humans, and
(c) studying their effects in human autonomy teaming. There is also an imperative to
study the transparency of these systems in the broader societal context.
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